










AN ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATE LENDING IN JAPAN  
 
Christian Künne and Frank Westermann 
 
 























INSTITUT FÜR EMPIRISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG 
University of Osnabrueck 
Rolandstrasse 8 
49069 Osnabrück 
Germany An analysis of aggregate lending in Japan 
 
By Christian Künne and Frank Westermann
1 
Fachgebiet Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik 






Aggregate bank lending has stagnated since 1990 in Japan. This observation has generated a 
debate on whether the supply side of the credit market had an effect on the economy in its 
recent  slowdown.  At  this  point,  the  evidence  is  ambiguous.  The  hypothesis  is  primarily 
challenged by the low level of interest rates.  However, in this paper we analyse indicators 
that also point towards a credit crunch explanation: the development of commercial paper, as 
a substitute for bank lending, and survey data on the firms’ evaluation of the lending attitude 
of banks. We find that while aggregate lending has stagnated, there was a continued high 
demand  for  commercial  paper.  Using  the  Short-term  Economic  Survey  of  Enterprises  in 
Japan (Tankan), we also document that small firms felt more credit constrained than larger 
firms  until  recently  in  Japan.  This  difference  has  been  reduced,  and  has  lost  statistical 
significance, however, in the recent recovery since 2003. Finally, we point out that there 
exists a striking similarity between the recent developments in Germany and Japan in the 
1990ies.  
                                                            
1 I would like to thank the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies at the bank of Japan for their hospitality 
during two research visits, where this project has started. I also thank Nanette Lindenberg for excellent research 
assistance. Introduction 
 
After the Japanese banking crisis in 1997/1998, aggregate lending has been stagnating or even 
falling in levels (see figure 1). In a growing economy, this is an unusual phenomenon and it 
has generated a debate on whether aggregate growth masks deeper sectoral asymmetries in the 
economic development of the country. In particular, the question has been raised whether 
small bank dependent firms suffer from the slowdown in aggregate lending, while the larger 
firms still have the option to utilize alternative forms of financing in the capital market.  
The evidence at this point is ambigious. It is primarily challenged by the low level of 
interest rates. Furthermore, no evidence of substitution effects towards trade credit has been 
found in the literature. Most researchers have therefore concluded that the real economy was 
not severely affect by the financial turbulence and have rejected above hypothesis. While we 
also do not have a conclusive proof of the existence, we offer in this paper two alternative 
indicators that we feel have been overlooked in the discussion and that suggest that the credit 
crunch hypothesis, cannot easily be ruled out. 
We start by documenting the time path of the aggregate credit volume in the aftermath 
of the banking crisis. Although one cannot discern supply from demand side effects from this 
aggregate time series, it is remarkable, that this number has been falling on average over the 
past 10 years, while GDP (even in nominal terms, despite deflation) has experienced positive 
growth. Tornell and Westermann (2005) argue that such a disconnection between credit and 
real output is characteristic of an economy, in which different sectors for firm types have 
different access to credit markets. It could for instance be the case, that mostly the larger 
firms, that have access to a variety of financial instruments as well as international capital 
markets, continue to invest and grow, and are responsible for the aggregate growth of the 
economy, while the smaller bank dependent firms experience a sustained credit crunch. 
As  a  first  indicator  that  is  consistent  with  this  hypothesis,  we  show  that  the 
commercial paper market has been active in issuing new paper (in net terms) throughout the 
2past decade, with a peak of new commercial paper issuance during the banking crisis years 
1997 and 1998.  Secondly, we aim to investigate the difference between large and small firms 
more directly. Using a panel data set from the Japanese TANKAN survey, we find that there 
has been a significantly different response to the question on the firm’s evaluation of the 
banks’  lending  attitude  between small and large firms in the years following the banking 
crisis. More recently, however, this difference has been substantially reduced. 
In the latter sections of this paper, we perform several robustness tests to this finding. 
Using instrumental variables, different estimators and different sets of control variables, we 
find that the main variable of interest – the dummy variable that captures the size of the firms 
– remains significant until 2003 throughout the different empirical specifications.  
 
 
Aggregate credit volume 
As shown in Figure 1, the aggregate credit volume has been stagnating since the beginning of 
the banking crisis in 1997, and was falling thereafter until the end of 2004. Since then there 
has been a moderate recovery. This behaviour is remarkable, as in a growing economy, both 
GDP and aggregate credit usually grow (or fall) together. Despite other economic problems, 
including deflation and growing public debt, Japan experienced on average over these ten 
years positive real GDP growth of 1.2%. Even nominal growth still reached a moderate 0.3%. 
Aggregate credit, by constrast, was falling by 1.2% per year. Over the course of ten years, this 















































































































































































































































The observation of falling credit itself is not sufficient, however, to conclude that there has 
been a credit crunch. It is impossible to discern the supply of and the demand for credit from 
this graph. In particular, in a low interest rate environment, it is possible, that the lack of 
demand  for  credit  is  responsible  for  the  decline  in  aggregate  lending.  In  the  academic 
literature, and in the public debate, this latter view is predominant. In the remainder of the 
paper, we try to challenge this hypothesis. We look at different indicators that are typically 
used in the literature to uncover supply side effects: the behaviour of close substitutes of 
aggregate lending and firm level survey results. 
 
 
The external financing mix  
More informative than the volume of aggregate lending is the development of an important 
substitute for bank credit: short-term commercial paper. This indicator is used in a paper by 
Kashyap,  Stein  und  Wilcox  (AER  1993)  for  the  United  States,  who  find  that  after 
Figure 1: Loans (nominal) 
Source: Bank of Japan 
4contractionary monetary policy of the Fed, firms substitute commercial paper for bank credit. 
In their paper, this is taken as evidence of the credit channel of monetary policy. 
 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Under the assumption that the decline in aggregate credit is due to changes in the demand for 
credit, one would expect that all substitutes of bank credit should display a similar behaviour. 
The  amount  of  commercial  paper held and issued by firms should therefore also decline. 
Conversely, if supply factors also play a role, it should increase due to a substitution effect.
2 
 
                                                            
2 Note that this also holds, if the interest rate for bank credit does not increase: From a banks perspective, this 
could be optimal if it aims to increase the share of good risks in its portfolio. At a higher interest rate, only the 
bad risks might be willing to take on credit. Given the recent downgrading of the banks, the incentives to avoid 
such a separating equilibrium are clear. If interest rates do not increase, effect on the volume must be even more 
pronounced. As the change in credit is exactly zero since the beginning of the credit crunch, this view can be 
justified. 
 
Source: Bank of Japan 
5As Fig. 2 shows, there was no clear decline in commercial paper issuance in Japan while 
aggregate credit was falling. On the contrary, during the period of the suspected credit crunch 
commercial paper issuance was an actively used alternative instrument of financing for large 
firm, and particularly high in the years of the banking crisis 1997/1998. This first observation 
points to the view that there might at least also have been a supply side change that affected 
some firms in their credit situation.
3 
 
Fukuda, S., M. Kasuya and K. Akashi (2006) investigate the substitution effect with regard to 
trade credit, another major alternative form of financing. In a comprehensive econometric 
analysis, they did not find evidence of substitution effects in the years 1997 and 1998. While 
this indicates, that smaller firms did not seek this form of alternative financing,  it does not 
rule out that the substitution effect could have occurred in other form, such as a substitution 
towards commercial paper by the larger firms. The time path of commercial paper above 
might therefore be an explanation for their empirical finding. While for the existence of a 
substitution effect, it seems to be sufficient to point out one alternative source, the claim of 
the absence of such effects, in our view, would require an analysis of all forms of substitutes, 
including commercial paper. This view is acknowledged in Taketa and Udell (2006), who 




                                                            
3 When comparing the two graphs, note that the aggregate credit volume is a stock variable, while the net 
issuance of commercial paper is a flow variable. As the net flows have always been positive, the stock of 
commercial paper must have been increasing monotonously over the period. 
6Firm level data from the TANKAN Survey 
 
An alternative way to assess the presence of a credit crunch and to distinguish supply-side 
from demand-side effects is to directly ask the firms about their perception of the banks’ 
lending attitude. Figure 3 shows the results of the TANKAN-Survey in Japan, which has 
asked firms about the perceived lending attitude of banks over the last 30 years. This question 
can be answered on a scale from -100 (severe) to 100 (accommodating). Cargill, Hutchison 
and Ito (2000) as well as Hutchison (2000) use this indicator to point to the possibility that 













































































































































Note: In the TANKAN and ifo surveys ,banks’ attitude to lend is evaluated by the firms on a scale of 
“accommodating” to „severe”.  
 
Source: Bank of Japan. 
 
Figure 3 shows that in the beginning of the banking crisis (first quarter of 1997), the average 
evaluation  of  firms  regarding  the  lending  attitude  of  banks  was  quite  positive.  After  the 
beginning of the crisis, this index fell sharply to its lowest point in the last decade. After 
Figure 3: Lending attitude of all enterprises 
7reaching its lowest value in the fourth quarter of 1998, it recovered steadily, with the exeption 
of annother downturn from 2001 to 2003. In the most recent recovery that started 2003/2004, 
the evaluation of the banks’ lending  attitude by the firm has been mostly accommodating. 
 
 
A probit analysis of the perceived lending attitude  
In this section, we take an attempt to analyse in more depth the response of the Japanese 
firms. We will investigate the time path of the answers over the last 7 years. During these 
years  the  data  are  available  at  a  disaggregate  level  and  allow  us  to  distinguish  between 
subgroups of large and small firms. This disaggregated view may help to shed light on the 
question of whether the negative evaluation of the lending attitude of Japanese banks and the 
slowdown of aggregate lending reflects a supply or demand side problem.  
 
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that on average, small firms have evaluated the lending attitude of 
the banks more negatively than large firms. This observation could be an indicator that large 
firms, that have access to other forms of financing than bank credit, are less credit constrained 
than  small  firms.  This  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Arikawa  and  Miyajima  (2006), 
Tornell  and Westermann (2002) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). However, it is not clear, if 
this also reflects an unusual situation of a “credit crunch”, as the difference in the access to 
financial alternative also exists in normal times. In the following, we therefore investigate 
whether the difference between large and small firms has been changing over time.  Panel B 
shows that the difference between the two groups has indeed been declining over the last 
decade. The difference in the responses has been reduced by more than half over the sample 
period.  
 
8In the Tankan Survey, we have sectoral information for 27 Sectors (2000:1 – 2003:4) or 30 
sectors (2004:1 – 2007:2) and three size groups (large, medium and small). In the absence of 
truly individual firm specific data, we treat each of the size and sector units, as firm-level 
observations.  This  leads  to  a  cross  section  of  81  or  90  observations  and  a  time  series 











































































































































































































Mean of large firms Mean of small firms
         
 
 
In order to estimate the relationship between the response to the lending question and the size 
of firms more formally, we estimate the following regression: 
 
, _ 3 3 2 1 0 i i i i i i EXPORT D EXPECT CURRENT LARGE y ε β β β β β + + + + + =   (1) 
Figure 4, Panel A: Large and small firms lending attitude over time 
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This difference between large and small firms, in their evaluation of bank lending attitudes, also prevails when 
controlling for several firm characteristics. We estimate the following equations as a binary probit regression, 
where y, the response in the questionnaire takes the value of 1 if the firm evaluates the credit situation as severe 
and 0 if it evaluates the situation as either accommodating or not so severe. 
 
 
where LARGE is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is large and 0 when it is small. 
CURRENT denotes the firm’s evaluation of the current economic situation. EXPECT denotes 
the business expectations and EXPORT is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is an 
exporter and zero otherwise.  
 
Figure 5 displays the results for the dummy variable large in a rolling regression from the first 
quarter  of  2000  to  the  second  quarter  of  2007.  We  find  that  after  controlling  for  other 
variables  the  size  of  the  firms  has  a  statistically  significant  negative  impact  of  the  firm’s 
evaluation of the banks’ lending attitude in the beginning of the sample period.  
 
Figure 4, Panel B: Difference in large and small firms lending attitude over time 
Source: 
10It  is  remarkable  that  in  the  end  of  the  sample  period,  the  statistical  significance  of  the 
differences in the responses of small and large firms disappears. The second quarter of 2003, 
is the last sample that is significant at the 5% level. It follows that significant differences 
between large and small firms in responding to this question do not arise in normal times. The 
measurable difference in the beginning of the sample could therefore be consistent with the 
view that small firms suffered from a supply side restriction on lending. Being able to falsify 
the hypothesis that small firms always respond differently than large firms to the lending 
question makes the observed difference in the beginning of the sample, a noteworthy indicator 
of a credit crunch. It is indeed a reasonable indicator despite all reasons to be cautious about 
the  general  statement  of  a  credit  crunch  that  have  been  raised  throughout  the  paper.  The 
rolling regression provides a second piece of evidence that is consistent with the view that 

































































































































































































Note: Probit estimations for 2006:1, 2007:1 and 2007:2 are impossible with the cut-off-point 0, because of 
perfect binary response. All large firms have a positive lending attitude. The 2006:3 estimation is without the 
Dummy Export, because of perfect binary response. All firms with negative lending attitude are non-exporters. 
 
Figure 5: Dummy “Large” over time 
11 
Robustness tests 
In this section we perform several robustness tests of the main result reported above – the 
significance of the difference between large and small firms in the beginning of the sample 
that disappear in the end of the sample. 
As a start, we investigate, whether the result is driven by our estimation technique. Table 1 
reports the result of the regression (with a special focus on the variable “Large/Dummy”). In 
regressions 1.1 and 1.6, we use a logit and in 1.2. and 1.7 a probit estimator. Here the original 
answers of the firms are transformed to a 0-1 Dummy variable where 1 denotes a positive 
evaluation of the lending attitude of the banks. In regressions 1.3 and 1.8, we follow a 2-step 
procedure: in a first step, we explain in a preliminary regression the variables CURRENT and 
EXPECT with their one-period-lagged values. The fitted values of the variables are than used 
in the probit estimation. 
 
In the final regressions, we use the original continuous nature of the responses from -100 to 
+100 and run first a regular OLS regression. Secondly, we apply a two step least squares 
approach, where we use lagged values as instruments. 
 
While the point estimates vary across these different estimation techniques, the significance of 
the size dummy in the beginning of the period, and the insignificance of the dummy in the end 
of the period remains unchanged. 
 
12Table 1: Robustness: Different methods of estimation 
Estimation period
Estimation method Logit Probit 2S-Probit OLS 2SLS Logit Probit 2S-Probit OLS 2SLS
[1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [1.5] [1.6] [1.7] [1.8] [1.9] [1.10]
C 0,869 0,459 0,525 * 8,925 *** 10,397 *** 1,615 *** 0,948 *** 0,621 ** 7,181 *** 5,402 **
(0.534) (0.295) (0.314) (2.696) (2.528) (0.600) (0.331) (0.296) (1.999) (2.576)
Dummy Large 1,729 ** 0,973 *** 0,953 ** 12,494 *** 11,888 *** -0,064 -0,093 -0,010 3,513 4,354
(0.696) (0.370) (0.377) (3.250) (4.036) (1.316) (0.691) (0.658) (2.790) (2.800)
Actual Business Condition 0,091 ** 0,056 *** 0,042 * 0,490 *** 0,705 ** -0,060 -0,037 0,016 0,749 *** 1,165 ***
(0.036) (0.019) (0.023) (0.172) (0.372) (0.053) (0.030) (0.041) (0.178) (0.426)
Expectation -0,033 -0,022 0,010 -0,065 -0,186 0,155 ** 0,090 ** 0,030 -0,340 * -0,756 *
(0.036) (0.018) (0.020) (0.169) (0.371) (0.069) (0.039) (0.042) (0.192) (0.427)
Dummy Export 0,326 0,268 0,492 1,763 2,413 2,473 ** 1,396 ** 1,375 ** 6,465 ** 5,910 *
(0.583) (0.339) (0.356) (3.076) (3.021) (1.184) (0.637) (0.623) (2.488) (2.993)
McFadden/adj. R-squared 0,289 0,288 0,311 0,411 0,391 0,359 0,367 0,326 0,458 0,423
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 90 90 90 90 90
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




Interesting in this set of regressions are also the other control variables. While the actual 
business  situation  is  significant  (at  least  in  the  OLS  regressions)  in  both  periods,  the 
expectations are only significant in the later period in some regressions. This by itself can be 
interpreted as evidence of tight credit conditions. The insignificance of the expectations for 
the access to credit implies that potential investment projects that have a high expected future 
return might not find financing in the current situation. 
 
Table 2: Robustness: Estimation output for an increasing set of variables 
Dependent variable: Lending Attitude (binary)
Estimation: Probit
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Estimation period
[2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4] [2.5] [2.6] [2.7] [2.8]
C 0,000 0,574 *** 0,593 ** 0,459 0,967 *** 0,848 *** 1,219 *** 0,948 ***
(0.171) (0.241) (0.242) (0.295) (0.193) (0.210) (0.294) (0.331)
Dummy Large 1,044 *** 0,932 ** 0,973 *** 0,973 *** 0,866 * 0,300 0,044 -0,093
(0.341) (0.365) (0.369) (0.370) (0.482) (0.531) (0.583) (0.691)
Actual Business Condition 0,035 *** 0,053 *** 0,056 *** 0,033 ** -0,030 -0,037
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.029) (0.030)
Expectation -0,019 -0,022 0,079 ** 0,090 **
(0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.039)
Dummy Export 0,268 1,396 **
(0.339) (0.637)
McFadden R-squared 0,095 0,271 0,282 0,288 0,060 0,179 0,261 0,367
Observations 81 81 81 81 90 90 90 90




13As a second robustness test, we further investigate the potential interaction of control 
variables. We add them step by step to the regression and find, that there is little change in the 
coefficients, which suggests that the simultaneity among the variables is not very high. 
Furthermore, this setup allows to trace the marginal R squared for each variable. Out of the 
total R squared of 0.288, the size dummy variable is responsible for about 0.095 in the earlier 
period, but only about 0.060 in the later period (although  the fit improved overall to 0.367 in 
the later period). The most important determinant of the response to the question is the actual 
business condition in the earlier period. In the later period, the expectations and the export 
dummy are of roughly equal importance. 
 
Table 3: Robustness: D_LARGE for different cut-off-points 
Dependent variable: Lending Attitude (binary)
Estimation: Probit
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Estimation period
Cut-off-point 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
[3.1] [3.2] [3.3] [3.4] [3.5] [3.6] [3.7] [3.8]
Dummy Large 0,973 *** 1,054 *** 0,795 ** 0,714 * -0,093 0,750 * 0,215 0,389
(0.370) (0.345) (0.346) (0.419) (0.691) (0.443) (0.351) (0.376)
Observations 81 81 81 81 90 90 90 90




In regression table 3, we furthermore investigate the robustness of the result with respect to 
different cut-off points of the 0-1 dummy. While the baseline regression attributes a 1 to all 
firms with a response larger than 0, table 3 contrasts the finding to the cut-off point of 10, 20 
and 30. Although this reduces the coefficient in magnitude, most of the regressions remain 
significant at the 5% level, except the last regression (cut-off of 30) that is significant at the 
10% level only. In the later period, all coefficients are insignificant except for the cut-off 
value of 10, were the coefficient is also significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
14Recent developments in Germany are reminiscent of Japan in the 1990s 
The recent macroeconomic developments in Germany are reminiscent of Japan in the early 
1990s. Most strikingly, Germany also experienced a sustained slowdown in aggregate lending  
since the first quarter of 2001. The similarities in the two countries include several aspects of 
the  historically  special  situation,  with  respect  to  macroeconomic  performance,  when  the 
slowdown in lending started and to the regulatory characteristics of the banking system. In 
both cases, a lending boom ended in a stock market crash –  in Japan in 1989, in Germany 
2001 – while banks aimed to achieve the Basel I and Basel II accords, respectively.  Japanese 
as well as German Banks hold substantial amounts of equity in other firms. As Ito (1998) 
pointed out, changes in stock prices – in contrast to most other OECD countries – therefore 
directly translate into fluctuations in the banks’ balance sheets. In the Basel I agreement, the 
revaluation gains from these equity holdings are considered ”Tier 2 Capital”, relevant for the 
risk adjusted capital asset ratio (up to 45% in Japan and 35% in Germany). Vice verca, a 
reduction  in  its  value  therefore  contributes  to  pressure  on  maintaining  the  capital  ratios. 
Hence, when new capital is difficult to raise, a substantial decline in the stock market can 
therefore more easily lead to a tightening of lending, and to a credit crunch situation in both 
countries.  
 
Ito, Hutchison and Westermann (2006) document the remarkable similarity in the time path of 
key macro variables in the two countries. The aggregate credit volume, the development of 
stock prices and those of new equity issues in both countries, before and after the beginning of 
the suspected credit crunch, are very similar. The authors also take a look at substitution 
effects  in  the  mix  of  firms’  external  financing,  and  finally  at  direct  surveys  from  the  ifo 
Institute as well as the Japanese TANKAN survey. Both indicate that in the aftermath of the 
stock market decline, there was a negative impact on the firms ability to borrow from banks - 
in Germany, starting in the first quarter of 2001 and in Japan, starting in the fourth quarter of 
151991. The present paper extends this analysis for Japan at the disaggregated level as well as 
for the more recent time period after the banking crisis in 1997/1998. 
 
Concluding remark 
The aim of this paper was to challenge the view that supply side factors did not play a role in 
the slowdown of aggregate lending in Japan. While we cannot claim a “proof” that a credit 
crunch  has  taken  place,  we  do,  however,  provide  two  standard  indicators  that  have  been 
overlooked in the discussion, that are consistent with a credit crunch explanation. 
The agenda for further research includes setting up a theoretical framework that takes into 
account the institutional characteristics that are special to Germany and Japan. Both countries 
have banking systems that allow a close integration between the banks and the firms. A full 
general  equilibrium  analysis  may  lead  to  policy  recommendations beyond the conclusions 
offered in this paper. 
Generally, the findings in this paper contribute to a growing literature that concludes that 
aggregate measures, such as gross domestic product or income are not sufficient to analyse 
policy  questions  in  a  modern  macroeconomic  setup.  Differences  between  large  and  small 
firms, exporters and non-exporters or sectors with different technology need to be taken into 
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17Appendix: The Data in the regression analysis 
The  data  are  taken  from  the  short-term  of  economic  survey  of  enterprises  in  Japan 
(TANKAN), published by the Bank of Japan, quarterly represented in the period 2000:1 to 
2007:2. The 2000:1 – 2003:4 period includes 27 industries and three different firm sizes: 
large, middle and small firms. In the absense of the underlying firm data, this allows us to 
construct  81 observations for the first 16 quarters. For the 2004:1 – 2007:2 period three exist 
30 industries, together 90 observations for 14 quarters. 
4,5  
The  main  variable  of  interest  in  our  paper  is  the  lending  attitude  of  financial institutions 
(Lending  Attitude).  Lending  Attitude  is  constructed  as  a  diffusion  index  that  ranges  from 
“Accommodative” to “Severe” in the range of -100 to 100 for each industry. For the probit 
and logit regression method Lending Attitude is transformed into a binary variable with the 
cut-off-point 0, i.e. Lending Attitude (binary) takes the value of 1 for index points larger than 
0, and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variables are Actual Business Condition, Expectation and the two dummy 
variables Large and Export. Actual Business Condition and Expectation are constructed as a 
diffusion index that ranges from “Favorable” to “Unfavorable” on a scale from -100 to 100 
for each industry. The variable Expectation is equal to the business condition forecast in the 
next quarter in the TANKAN survey. 
Dummy Large follows the TANKAN organization for firm size categories. The value is 1 for 
large firms and 0 for middle and small firms.  
The  dummy  variable  Export  is  calculated  using  the  values  for  sales  and  exports  in  the 
TANKAN survey. We assign a dummy variable value of 1 for industries with a sales-to-
exports ratio larger than 1% and 0 otherwise. Unlike the other variables in regression the 
                                                            
4 In 2004 the TANKAN survey was partly reorganized. For details see the explanation of the TANKAN, online 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/stat/tk/extk.htm. 
5 This structural break is relevant for the analysis as in the lagged cross-section estimations, the information is 
missing for the 2004:1 quarter. 
18dummy Export is based on biannual data.
6 Due to the structural break and missing information 
for values of sales and exports, the 2003:4 value of the dummy Export is partly calculated 
with forecasted values.
7  The 2007:2 values are based entirely on forecasting values. 
 
 
Table A1: Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Lending Attitude Diffusion Index of "Accommodative" minus "Severe" for the 
lending attitude of financial institutions. The index (-100 to 
100) is built for each industry as a whole. 
The Comprahansive Data Set of the TANKAN 
Survey for the years 2000 - 2007 (last available 
release of the year), Table A9.
Lending Attitude (binary) Transformation of the variable Lending Attitude into a binary 
variable, 1 for values higher than the cut-off-point, 0 otherwise. 
The cut-off-point is 0.
Author's calculation.
Actual Business Condition Diffusion Index of "Favorable" minus "Unfavorable". The index 
(-100 to 100) is built for each industry as a whole.
The Comprahansive Data Set of the TANKAN 
Survey for the years 2000 - 2007 (last available 
release of the year), Table A1.
Expectation Diffusion Index of "Favorable" minus "Unfavorable" for the 
business condition forecast in the next quarter. The index (-100 
to 100) is built for each industry as a whole.
The Comprahansive Data Set of the TANKAN 
Survey for the years 2000 - 2007 (last available 
release of the year), Table A1.
Dummy Large Dummy variable for the firm size. 1 for large firms (following 
the TANKAN organization), 0 otherwise.
Author's calculation using the TANKAN organization 
in firm size.
Dummy Export Dummy variable for export firms. 1 for exporters, 0 otherwise. 
The variabel is defined as 1 for industries more than 1% exports-
to-sales ratio. Contrary to other variables the dummy export 
based on half-year data.
Author's calculation using the export and sales values 
of The Comprahansive Data Set of the TANKAN 
Survey for the years 2000 - 2007 (last available 
release of the year), Tables A36 and A38 in the 




                                                            
6 Exactly: half-fiscal year data (April to March). The data is assigned in the according quarter. 
7 In particular 7 of 27: Shipbuilding and Heavy machinery, Other transportation machinery, Other 
manufacturing, Transportation, Communications, Services, Other non-manufacturing. 
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